The Hacks



THAT MADE US



WHOAMI

I am Alan Cook aka @cipherthink

- Sr. AppSec Engineer at a financial institution
- Focused on offensive security
- Background in Product Security, Sec. Engineering, Governance, etc.
- Experience across Financial Services, Healthcare, and Gaming verticals
- Interested in history, music, sports, and sailing

"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information. What we see and hear, how we work, what we think ... It's all about the information!"

-COSMO (SNEAKERS 1992)

RUNBOOK

- Introduction: structure, organization, and scope
- The Hacks!
- Q&A







THE HACKS

Known technical details about the hacks



CONTROLS

Security controls that could have prevented the hacks and/or have been implemented since



THEIR EFFECTS UPON US





POLITICAL

Governmental/Regulatory effects and policies resulting from hack



ECONOMIC

Micro/Macro economic effects resulting from hack



SOCIAL

Cultural effects resulting from hack













AOHell

"Basically, it is used to annoy others, get free service, and other things. You can knock people offline with it, you can Email bomb someone with it, and many other things."

-AOHell v3.0 ReadMe



- v1 of toolset released in AOL chat rooms (1994)
- V2-3 and various betas released (1995)
- Notable Features:
 - Free AOL
 - Fake Account Creator
 - PW/CC Fisher






Free AOL

- v3 of tool added functionality to allow users to enter a free area (such as billing) which would pause accounting for use of time and then revealed the AOL 'pay' windows
- It enumerates all the Window Handles and send them a message to show themselves but doesn't start accounting of time





- Generates all needed info to sign up for a new account, including name, address, phone number, city, state, and a valid CC#, and pre-fills the form
- AOL was only validating the CC# checksum and that it was a valid credit card







PW/CC Fisher

- Provided functionality to mass IM users in a room with a pre-text such as pretending to be AOL stall and asking for PW or CC info
- Save responses in a file on disk







Preventative:

Free AOL - Ensure time accounting starts with usage Fake Account Creator – Verify CC#s are active and valid PW/CC Flsher - User Education



Detective:

Free AOL - Audit/Alert on significant variation between logon time and free time



Corrective:



THEIR EFFECTS UPON US





POLITICAL

None



ECONOMIC

Unknown



SOCIAL

First phishing on a massive scale

First use of term Phishing
























On May 4, 2000, a virus spread by email message with a .vbs attachment. Running the script overwrote random Office and image files and hid mp3 files and spread by copying itself and emailing all address book contacts in Outlook.









Caused outages due to email servers having to be taken offline.

- Ford Motor Company
- Microsoft

Police in Philippines identified computer student Onel de Guzman of Manila as the author but were unable to prosecute due to lack of laws against malicious computer use.







THE CONTROLS



Preventative:

User Education
Prevention of execution of attachments
Disabling hidden file extensions for known filetypes



Detective:

Anti-virus*



Corrective:

Anti-virus* Backups



THEIR EFFECTS UPON US





POLITICAL

Philippine Congress enacts Republic Act No. 8792



ECONOMIC

\$10B+



SOCIAL

"Windows users everywhere learned to never, ever, open unsolicited attachments" -Kevin Poulsen







03 OPERATION GET RICH OR DIE TRYIN'

The Great Cyberheist






- Series of hacks in mid-2000s targeting credit card data
- Green Hat Enterprises crew led by Albert Gonzalez
- Gonzalez was a Secret Service informant for Operation Firewall















Pivot!

- Initially, so much old transaction data was identified it was hard to find card data that had not expired
- So, Stephen Watt created a "sniffer" program to find good data, encrypt it, and exfiltrate it out



United States Attorney's Office

District of Massachusetts

United States Afterney

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

December 23, 2009 www.usdoj.gov/usao/ma

Contact: Christina Diiorio-Storling Phone: (617) 748-3356 E-mail: usana media/ituoloi, gov.

> Hacker Sentenced For Providing Data Theft Tool in National Identity Theft Case







- HPS corporate network compromised via SQLi on website
- HPS identified the activity and thought all malware had been eradicated
- Attackers jumped to the payment processing network







Preventative:

Ensure strong encryption is used for all WiFi communication Isolate wireless networks transmitting card data Change default passwords/secrets on wireless network devices Purging sensitive data when no longer needed



Detective:

Logging and Monitoring with alerting for anomalous activity



Corrective:

Use a WAF to monitor and block HTTP requests for SQLi Implement WIDS/WIPS



THEIR EFFECTS UPON US





POLITICAL

Creation of PCI DSS Wireless Guidelines



ECONOMIC

\$400MM+*



SOCIAL

None







WEB WAR I

Rehearsal for Cyberwar



- DDoS attack begins April 28, 2007
- Estonia was highly connected
- Only way to mitigate attack was to implement a denylist to deny international traffic to websites
- Estonia's CERT works with ISPs around the world to filter out malicious traffic
- A week after DDOS starts it stops





- Attack consists of
 - DDoS attacks
 - Website defacement
 - DNS attacks
 - Mass email spam



THE HACK

- Second wave of attacks begin at midnight Moscow time on May 9, the Russian Victory Day
- "Those who are trying today to...
 desecrate memorials to war heroes
 are insulting their own people, sowing
 discord and new distrust between
 states and people"

-President Putin

Attacks disappear by end of May



THE HACK

NATO declines to consider an Article
 5 or Article 4 response







THE CONTROLS



Preventative:

CDN w/ DDOS Protection*



Detective:

Use dashboards to monitor bandwidth utilization and alert on spikes



Corrective:



THEIR EFFECTS UPON US





POLITICAL

Attacks sped up establishment of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE)

Tallinn Manual published



ECONOMIC

\$750MM



SOCIAL

Better understanding of cyber attacks

















Initial Vector

- Spear-phishing victims likely to have access to intellectual property
- Attack appears to come from a trusted source
- User opens file which exploited a 0-day in Internet Explorer







Dow











Google Attack


- Attack focused on two targets within Google
 - Email accounts of Chinese human rights activists
 - Source code for Google products
- Second zero-day used for SCM Perforce
- Contributing factor to Google "reviewing business operations in China"*





What's in a name?

- McAfee Aurora
- Symantec Elderwood
- CrowdStrike Sneaky Panda
- Dell Beijing Group









- Attackers used the same and other 0-days
- Targeted intellectual property
- Conducted watering hole attacks











Preventative:

User Education Run SCM software as a non-privileged user Require authentication to create new users in SCM Encrypt SCM data in transit



Detective:

Anti-virus*
Logging and monitoring and alerting on anomalous activity



Corrective:

Anti-virus*



THEIR EFFECTS UPON US





POLITICAL

Increased tensions between US and China



ECONOMIC

Unknown*



SOCIAL

Another indicator of China targeting Human Rights activists











STUXNET

Cyberweapon Deployed



- v1.001 of Stuxnet infects 4 organizations in June 2009
 - Foolad Technic
 - Behpajooh
 - Neda Industrial Group
 - CGJ (Control Gostar Jahed?)

```
ROG Pauloads ServiceBuffer
  art /wait RunD1132 exe Zwindir%\temp\"ZFF842.ocx.DDEnum
    /q %windir%\temp\~ZFF842.ocxJ
  DG Pauloads Flame@InstallationBat
 stallFlame
 ROG DefaultAttacks A InstallFlame Description
FROG. DefaultAttacks. A InstallFlame AgentIdentifier
FROG. DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame ShouldRunCMD
%temp%\fib32.bat
FROG. DefaultAttacks. A InstallFlame CommandLine
FROG. DefaultAttacks.A. InstallFlame ServiceTimeOut
FROG DefaultAttacks A InstallFlame AttackTimeOut
FROG. DefaultAttacks. A InstallFlame DeleteServicePayload
     DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame DeleteUploadedFiles
    DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame SampleInterval
    DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame MaxRetries
FROG.DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame RetriesLeft
FROG.DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame TTL
FROG DefaultAttacks A InstallFlame HomeID
ROG DefaultAttacks A InstallFlame FilesToUpload size
```



- Five months later Belarusian firm,
 VirusBlokAda, discovers a 0-day used and malicious use of RealTek Semiconductor cert to sign drivers
- 0-day used malicious .LNK files to spread via infected USB flash drives

```
ROG Pauloads ServiceBuffer
      /wait RunD1132.exe Zwindir%\temp\"ZFF842.ocx.DDEnum
    /q %windir%\temp\~ZFF842.ocxJ
  OG Pauloads Flame@InstallationBat
 ROG DefaultAttacks A InstallFlame Description
FROG.DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame AgentIdentifier
FROG. DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame ShouldRunCMD
%temp%\fib32.bat
ROG. DefaultAttacks. A. InstallFlame CommandLine
    DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame DeleteServicePayload
     DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame DeleteUploadedFiles
FROG DefaultAttacks A InstallFlame SampleInterval
    DefaultAttacks.A InstallFlame RetriesLeft
FROG DefaultAttacks A InstallFlame HomeID
FROG DefaultAttacks A InstallFlame FilesToUpload size
```





- Targeted Windows via 4 0-day attacks
 - Malicious .LNK files on USB flash drives
 - Privilege escalation via vulnerable keyboard file
 - Windows print spooler vuln.
 - Windows task scheduler vuln.





- Payload Step 7 software
 - Infects project files to MitM comms between Windows and Siemens PLCs
- Payload PLC
 - Checks for specific criteria, modifies the frequency of the motor to change rotational speed







Preventative:

Disabling use of USB flash drives in sensitive trust zones Harden all devices by disabling unnecessary services Use application whitelisting to limit code execution Implement HIDS



Detective:

Logging and monitoring with alerts for anomalous activity Use of honeypots (both desktop/server and SCADA)

Anti-virus*



Corrective:

Anti-virus*



THEIR EFFECTS UPON US





POLITICAL

Slows advancement of Iran's nuclear program



ECONOMIC

Unknown



SOCIAL

Multiple references in popular media: Castle S8E18, Trojan Horse, Ghost in the Shell: Arise, Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell:

















THANKS!

Do you have any questions?



@cipherthink



https://www.linkedin.com/in/davyalancook2/



https://github.com/cipherthink/TheHacksThatMadeUs









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